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BANKRUPTCY-A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACTION AND A Lis
PENDENS MAY CREATE A LIEN WHICH SURVIVES A BANKRUPTCY Dis-
CHARGE. Clark v. Bank of Bentonville, 308 Ark. 241, 824 S.W.2d 358
(1992).
On April 14, 1986, Jack and Norma Clark conveyed certain real
property in Benton County, Arkansas to Gary Clark, trustee of the
Jack M. Clark trust.1 At the time of the conveyance, the Clarks owed
the Bank of Bentonville (the Bank) approximately $193,050 secured by
two tracts of real estate. 2 Approximately one month after the convey-
ance to the trust, the Bank brought a foreclosure action against the
Clarks which resulted in the sale of the two tracts of property securing
the Clarks' bank loans.3 The Bank also obtained deficiency judgments
which totalled $193,650."
On January 7, 1987, the Bank filed a complaint, along with a lis
pendens' notice, in the Benton County Chancery Court to set aside the
Clarks' transfer to the trust as a fraudulent conveyance.' Before a
judgment was rendered by the chancery court in the fraudulent convey-
ance action, the Clarks filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code7 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central
District of California, San Bernardino Division.8
The Bank took no action to establish its status as a secured credi-
1. Clark v. Bank of Bentonville, 308 Ark. 241, 243, 824 S.W.2d 358, 359 (1992).
2. Id. at 247, 824 S.W.2d at 361. Neither tract of real estate securing the Clarks' loans
were at issue in this case. Id.
3. Id. at 248, 824 S.W.2d at 362.
4. Id.
5. " 'Lis pendens' literally means a pending suit." 54 C.J.S. Lis PENDENS § 2 (1987). A
notice of lis pendens is "a notice filed on public records for the purpose of warning all persons that
the title to certain property is in litigation," and that, if they purchase the defendant's claim in the
same, "they are in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
932 (6th ed. 1990). For Arkansas' codification of lis pendens requirements see ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-59-101 to -106 (Michie 1987).
6. 308 Ark. at 243, 824 S.W.2d at 359. A fraudulent conveyance action is a suit to recover
a transfer made by a debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor or made for
less than equivalent value when the debtor's debts are beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they
became due. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204 (Michie 1991).
7. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy provides for the orderly liquidation of the debtor's assets by a
bankruptcy trustee to satisfy creditors' claims. See II U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1979 & Supp. 1992).
8. 308 Ark. at 243, 824 S.W.2d at 359.
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tor in the bankruptcy9 nor did it pursue the fraudulent conveyance ac-
tion against the Clarks in the bankruptcy proceeding. 10 The Chapter 7
trustee, who could have elected to pursue the Bank's state law claim for
the benefit of all of the Clarks' creditors," also failed to take any such
action in the bankruptcy.' 2
The Clarks received a discharge in bankruptcy on December 30,
1987.13 Following the bankruptcy discharge, the Bank proceeded with
its fraudulent conveyance action.14 The Benton County Chancery Court
granted judgment for the Bank and ordered that the fraudulently con-
veyed real property be sold and the proceeds applied to the Clarks' debt
to the bank.15 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the chancery
court decision.' 6 The supreme court held that the filing of the lis
pendens notice in the fraudulent conveyance action gave the Bank a
pre-judgment lien on the real property.' The supreme court further
held that even though the discharge in bankruptcy relieved the Clarks
of any personal liability on the debt, the lien survived the discharge and
the Bank was free to pursue an in rem action'" to collect its debt.'9
Clark v. Bank of Bentonville, 308 Ark. 241, 824 S.W.2d 358 (1992).
The issue of whether a secured creditor has in rem rights against
debtor's property after a bankruptcy discharge is inextricably inter-
9. Id. at 244-45, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
10. Id. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361. See, e.g. Nebraska State Bank v. Jones, 846 F.2d 477,
478 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a single creditor lacks standing to pursue a fraudulent convey-
ance action in a bankruptcy). Additionally, the Bank in Clark was prohibited by the automatic
stay of II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1979), which prohibits creditors from taking any action against the
debtor's property during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, from pursuing the fraudulent
conveyance action during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 308 Ark. at 246, 824
S.W.2d at 361.
11. 308 Ark, at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1979) which states:
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor
holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is
not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
12. 308 Ark. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361.
13. Id. at 243, 824 S.W.2d at 359.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 243-44, 824 S.W.2d at 359.
16. Id. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 359.
17. Id. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
18. In rem is "a technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted against
the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in personam." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1990).
19. 308 Ark. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
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twined with the evolution of reaffirmation agreements.20 The emergence
of reaffirmation agreements can be traced back to the common law
doctrine of "moral obligation. ' 21 At common law, it was generally be-
lieved "that a promise made in recognition of a moral obligation, aris-
ing out of a benefit previously received, was not enforceable. '22 How-
ever, exceptions to this general rule were developed. In the late
eighteenth century, English attorneys began arguing that a bankrupt
debtor had a moral obligation to repay discharged debts.23 In Trueman
v. Fenton,2 a case decided by the English court in 1777, Lord Mans-
field declared that a debtor was morally obligated to pay discharged
debts, and a new promise to pay a discharged debt was sufficient con-
sideration to revive the enforceability of the debt.25
Following the decision in Trueman, creditors began to use reaffir-
mation agreements to escape the effect of the bankruptcy discharge. 26
In 1849 in an effort to control the problem, the English Parliament
declared all such reaffirmation agreements unenforceable.21 However,
just before reaffirmations were banned in England, their use began to
grow in the United States.28 Even after Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, most states "either by statute or case law, recog-
nized the theory that a discharge did not prohibit collection of the debt
or erase the debt."' 29 This meant that creditors were permitted to ignore
the bankruptcy discharge and pursue post-bankruptcy litigation to col-
lect the debt. a0
20. In re Ray, 26 B.R. 534, 537 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
21. Timothy A. Hunt, Comment, Reaffirmation Agreements: A Fight for Enforceability
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 431, 433 (1982).
22. Id. at 433-34.,
23. Douglass G. Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Discharged Debts:
A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L.J. 36, 39-44 (1971).
24. 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 (K.B. 1777). In Trueman, the debtor filed bankruptcy on January
19, 1775, at which time he owed a creditor money for the purchase of linen. In an effort to
maintain his business relationship with the creditor, the debtor voluntarily agreed to reaffirm the
debt. When the creditor attempted to enforce the agreement, the debtor refused to comply, argu-
ing the agreement was intended as an evasion of the bankruptcy laws. Id. at 1232-33.
25. Hunt, supra note 21, at 434-35.
26. Hunt, supra note 21, at 435.
27. Hunt, supra note 21, at 435. See also 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, § 204 (1849); accord, 24 &
25 Vict. c. 134, § 164 (1861).
28. See Hunt, supra note 21, at 435; Boshkoff, supra note 23, at 46.
29. Hunt, supra note 21, at 436. See, e.g., Jersey City Ins. Co. v. Archer, 25 N.E. 338
(N.Y. 1890) (stating that the New York Code did not prohibit written reaffirmation of a dis-
charged debt); Hill v. Trainer, 5 N.W: 926 (Wis. 1880) (holding that a promise by the debtor to
pay a discharged debt is enforceable).
30. Hunt, supra note 21, at 436-37.
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Relying on such case law and statutes, creditors often harassed
debtors into paying the discharged debt.31 Often creditors would file
suit in state court in the hope that the debtor would rely upon the
bankruptcy discharge and fail to appear in the subsequent action.32
Creditors also used the threat of enforcing their in rem rights as a
means of coercing the debtor into reviving his in personam obligation
which had been discharged.33
In 1886 in Long v. Bullard,4 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the creditor's right to pursue its rights in rem against the prop-
erty of the debtor notwithstanding the discharge of the personal liabil-
ity of the debtor on the underlying debt. 8 In Long, a debtor in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding claimed that certain real property, which was
mortgaged to a creditor, was exempt from the creditors' claims pursu-
ant to state law.36 After the debtor was discharged, the creditor sought
to foreclose its mortgage lien." The debtor argued that the discharge of
the debt in the bankruptcy prevented the creditor from taking post-
discharge actions to collect the debt.38 The Supreme Court held that
the creditor's security interest was preserved notwithstanding the dis-
charge of the underlying debt in the bankruptcy because no action was
taken in the bankruptcy to avoid the lien. 39
The survival of an unavoided lien post-discharge was codified by
Congress in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and was followed by the
courts until the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
"Bankruptcy Code"). 0 The plain language of § 522(c)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that a lien which was not avoided during the
bankruptcy proceeding survived the discharge. 4' However, following
31. See In re Weathers, 15 B.R. 945, 950 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) ("This language [11
U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)] was designed to prevent creditors with avoided liens from harassing naive
debtors with groundless threats of repossession.") See also Hunt, supra note 21, at 438.
32. Hunt, supra note 21, at 436-37.
33. See Boshkoff, supra note 23, at 37.
34. 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
35. Id. at 620-21.
36. Id. at 618.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 619-20.
39. Id. at 620-21.
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, 295 U.S. 555, 582-83 (1935) ("[Unless the mortgagee released his security in order to
prove in bankruptcy for the full amount of the debt, a mortgage even of exempt property was not
disturbed by bankruptcy proceedings").
41. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (1979 & Supp. 1991) states:
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable
[Vol. 15:319
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the passage of the Bankruptcy Code some courts questioned whether a
lien remained valid after the discharge of the debt. 2 Courts that took
this position generally found that the language of 11 U.S.C. §
524(a)(2),' 3 which prohibited collection efforts against the "property of
the debtor," was clear and unambiguous in its intent to protect the
debtor from in rem actions after the discharge of the debt.'
One of the early cases following the passage of the Bankruptcy
Code which took the position that under the Bankruptcy Code a dis-
charge of the debt rendered the lien invalid was In re Williams. 5 In
Williams, a creditor attempted to assert its lien against the debtor's
property post-discharge."6 The debtor argued that under the Bank-
ruptcy Code liens no longer survived discharge as they did under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.' In support of their argument, the debtors in
Williams pointed out the numerous ways the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vided for creditors to preserve their liens. 8 For example, even though a
during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, or that is determined
under section 502 of this title as if such debt had arisen, before the commencement of
the case, except -
(2) a debt secured by a lien that is -
(A)(i) .not avoided under subsection (f) or (g) of this section or under
section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title; and (ii) not
void under section 506(d) of this title.
42. See, e.g., In re Williams, 9 BR. 228, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (stating that unless a
creditor takes affirmative action to preserve its lien prior to discharge, both the debt and the lien
are extinguished); In re Ray, 26 B.R. 534, 536 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (holding that a bank's lien
on debtor's automobile, which was exempt from the bankruptcy estate, was not enforceable fol-
lowing the bankruptcy discharge).
43. Prior to its amendment by the Bankruptcy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984), 11
U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1979) read as follows:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title -
(2) Operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived. (emphasis added).
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 524.01(3), 524.16 (15th ed. 1992).
44. See In re Ray, 26 B.R. 534 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). In Ray, the court held that a bank's
lien on debtor's automobile, as to which debtor had been granted an exemption, was unenforceable
after debtor's discharge. Id. at 536. The bank in Ray did not seek relief from the automatic stay,
abandonment, reaffirmation, nor did it participate in any court action or proceeding to obtain
possession of its collateral prior to debtor's discharge. Id.
45. 9 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
46. Id. at 230.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 231.
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creditor was prohibited from taking action outside the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding against debtors or their property, the creditor could seek relief
from the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and proceed in state
court with its action.49 Alternatively, a creditor could proceed with
those same actions in the bankruptcy court under the expanded juris-
diction granted to the bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1471.50 The creditor also has the option of seeking a reaffirmation
agreement from the debtors, abandonment of the collateral pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 554(b), disposition of the collateral to it pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 725, or any combination of these alternatives." The debtors
further argued that when a creditor failed to avail itself of the Code's
lien preservation methods, the creditor lost its in rem rights upon
discharge.5 1
In finding that a lien no longer survived the discharge, the Wil-
liams court looked at the language of the Bankruptcy Code.53 At the
time of the court's decision in Williams, § 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code provided that a creditor was enjoined from acts to collect "from
property of the debtor."' 5" This language differed from § 524(a)(2)'s
predecessor, § 14f of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which prohibited
attempts to collect debts as "personal liabilities" of the debtor. 55 The
court found that the language of § 522(c)(2),11 which provides that a
lien on property which is not avoided in the bankruptcy proceeding sur-
vives the discharge, conflicted with the language of § 524(a)(2),11
which prohibited acts post-discharge to collect from the property of the
debtor.5 8
After determining that the language of the Bankruptcy Code was
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 230.
53. Id. at 231.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1979), supra note 43.
55. § 14f of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in part stated:
An order of discharge shall -
(2) enjoin all creditors whose debts are discharged from thereafter instituting
or continuing any action or employing any process to collect such debts as
personal liabilities of the bankrupt. [emphasis added].
9 B.R. at 231.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (1979), supra note 41.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1979), supra note 43.
58. 9 B.R. 228, 232 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
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in conflict, the Williams court held that the conflict could only be re-
solved by finding that without reaffirmation of the debt by the debtors
during the bankruptcy, the lien did not survive the discharge.5 9 The
court found that the plain meaning of the language of § 524(a)(2),
which prohibits post-discharge collection attempts "from the property
of the debtor," clearly showed an intent by Congress that a lien secur-
ing a debt which was not reaffirmed in the bankruptcy proceeding did
not survive the discharge."0
The majority of courts declined to follow the reasoning of the
court in Williamsa" and today, Williams is clearly a minority view.
6 2
Most courts today hold that the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative
history, which indicates a specific intent by Congress to adopt the rule
set forth in Long v. Bullard," plainly establish that valid liens that
have not been disallowed or avoided survive the bankruptcy discharge
of the underlying debt. 4 The House Report in connection with §
522(c)(2) states that "[t]he bankruptcy discharge will not prevent en-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 232-33. See also U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, 6321, 6322 ("[l]n
effect, the discharge extinguishes the debt, and creditors may not attempt to avoid that."). (em-
phasis added).
61. E.g., In re Anderson, 95 B.R. 506, 508 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that an attor-
ney's equitable common law charging lien survives discharge); Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. (In re Lellock), 811 F.2d 186, 190 (3rd Cir. 1987) (stating that a lien on a life
insurance policy survives the discharge of the debt); In re Cassi, 24 B.R. 619, 626 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1982) ("[A] valid, pre-filed lien that is not otherwise avoided during the bankruptcy proceed-
ings is not extinguished by the discharge and remains enforceable in rem"); In re Andrews, 22
B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982) (explaining that because of the debtor's failure to take
timely actions to avoid an avoidable judicial lien, the lien survived the discharge); In re Weathers,
15 B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (holding that the debtor's homestead, which secured a
debt to a creditor, was liable for the debt after the discharge where the mortgage lien was not
voided or avoided under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
62. See Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Lellock), 811 F.2d 186 (3rd
Cir. 1987), in which the court declined to follow the decision of the court in In re Ray, 26 B.R.
524 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983), and In re Williams, 9 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). The court
stated that it would "follow the majority of courts which hold that the Bankruptcy Code and its
legislative history plainly establish the better rule of law - that valid liens that have not been
disallowed or avoided survive the bankruptcy discharge of the underlying debt." Id. at 189.
63. 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886).
64. Id. at 620-21. See also Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833, 1835-36 (1991) (holding that if
a judicial lien that is avoidable under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code impairs an exemption
it may be avoided so that it does not survive the discharge even if state law defines the exempt
property in such a way as to specifically exclude property encumbered by such liens); Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991) ("[l~t was well settled when § 522(f) was enacted that
valid liens obtained before bankruptcy could be enforced on exempt property, . . . including other-
wise exempt homestead property.").
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forcement of valid liens. The rule of Long v. Bullard ... is accepted
with respect to the enforcement of valid liens on nonexempt property as
well as on exempt property."'6 5 In 1984 in an effort to clear up the
confusion surrounding the language of § 524(a)(2), Congress amended
§ 524(a)(2)6" and removed the language which troubled the Court in
Williams, i.e., the language prohibiting post-discharge collection "from
the property of the debtor.""7
Courts rejecting the reasoning in Williams have held that a wide
variety of liens may survive the discharge of the debtor's personal lia-
bility. For example, a lien on a life insurance policy was held to survive
a bankruptcy discharge, even though at the time of the assignment of
the policy to the creditor the debtor had no interest in it because the
policy had not matured. 68 A purchase money security interest in goods
sold by a creditor to a debtor is another lien that was found by a court
to survive the discharge. 9 Common law liens, such as an equitable lien
in the nature of attorney's common law charging lien,70 and statutory
liens, such as those granted to hospitals that provide medical services to
the debtor, 1 have also been held to survive a bankruptcy discharge.
Even liens that are avoidable in the bankruptcy proceeding can survive
the discharge if the debtor fails to take timely action to avoid them.72
65. HR. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6317. See also S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978), reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6317.
66. Bankruptcy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984).
67. The current version of II U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1979 and Supp. 1991) reads as follows:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title -
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived;
See also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 524.01(l), at 524-27 (15th ed. 1992).
68. See, e.g., Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Lellock), 811 F.2d 186,
189 (3rd Cir. 1987).
69. See, e.g., In re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603, 607 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that a
secured interest in consumer goods survives the discharge in bankruptcy); In re Pierce, 29 B.R.
612, 614-15 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that a purchase money security interest survives the
discharge).
70. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 95 B.R. 506, 508 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (stating that an
attorney's equitable, common law charging lien is valid and survives discharge).
71. See, e.g., In re Smith, 119 B.R. 714, 720 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) ("Although judgments
and judgment liens may be avoided by the discharge and may also be voided under section 522(f)
as an impairment of exemption, valid statutory liens are neither effected by discharge or exemp-
tion declarations.").
72. See In re Andrews, 22 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982) (holding that creditor's
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A 1991 United States Supreme Court decision appears to provide
debtors with a method of protecting their property from in rem actions
by creditors post-discharge. In Johnson v. Home State Bank' 3 a bank
began an action to foreclose its mortgage on the debtor's farm.7 ' While
the foreclosure action was pending, the debtor filed a Chapter .7 bank-
ruptcy.75 The Bankruptcy Court discharged the debtor's personal liabil-
ity on the notes to the bank.7 6 However, after the discharge the bank
continued its previously filed foreclosure action and obtained an in rem
judgment against the debtor." Prior to the foreclosure sale, the debtor
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, listing the debt to the bank as a claim
to be paid through the Chapter 13 plan.78 The bank objected to the
debtor's proposed payment of its claim through the Chapter 13 plan.79
The bank argued that because the debtor's personal liability had been
discharged, the bank no longer had a "claim" against the debtor sub-
ject to rescheduling under Chapter 13.8o The United State Supreme
Court held that the bank's lien was a claim that could be satisfied
through the Chapter 13 plan.8 Therefore, the bank's remedies were
limited to payments under the Chapter 13 plan and the debtor's prop-
erty was free and clear of the bank's claim or interest.82
Although the majority of courts allow a creditor to pursue post-
discharge enforcement of a valid lien on debtor's property,"3 creditors
judicial liens on debtor's real estate survived bankruptcy proceedings when debtor failed to timely
file a complaint to avoid the liens before discharge order was entered). Compare, Nobel v.
Yingling, 29 B.R. 998, 1002 (Bankr. D. Del. 1983) (stating that debtor is not required to take any
action prior to discharge to avoid judicial liens under the lien avoidance provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
73. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
74. Id. at 2152.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See II U.S.C. § 1327(b), (c) (1979), which states:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the con-
firmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, the
property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of
any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan. (emphasis added).
83. See In re Weathers, 15 B.R. 945, 948 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) ("[W]ith the exception of
Judge Pusateri's decision [in In re Williams, 9 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981)], it appears that
in all cases decided under the Code, the courts have held that liens survived discharge.").
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are prohibited from taking any action to subject the debtor to personal
liability."' Any action taken by a creditor to subject the debtor to per-
sonal liability may cause the imposition of penalties against the credi-
tor, such as debtor's attorneys fees and costs incurred in defending the
suit.85
In order to prevent a lien from surviving the discharge of the
debtor, most courts have held that the debtor must take some affirma-
tive action to avoid the lien during the bankruptcy proceeding. 86 "A
secured creditor must, of course, respond to an attempt by [a] trustee
or debtor to . . .avoid his lien. '"8 7 However, a secured creditor has no
affirmative duty during the bankruptcy proceedings to ensure that its
valid pre-bankruptcy lien survives. 88 Most courts have also held that
even if the secured creditor chooses not to file a claim in the debtor's
bankruptcy or pursue any other remedies available to it under the
Bankruptcy Code,89 the creditor may still enforce its lien against the
debtor's property post-discharge.90
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1979), which states:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title -
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judg-
ment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to
any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title,
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
85. See, e.g., In re Pierce, 29 B.R. 612, 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that a credi-
tor attempting to collect a discharged debt as a personal liability of debtor was liable to the debtor
for attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the action).
86. See In re Dickinson, 24 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (stating that a valid lien
created pre-bankruptcy survives the debtor's discharge notwithstanding the creditor's inactivity
during the bankruptcy proceeding); In re Thomas, 102 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989)
("[I]t is incumbent upon the debtor, not the creditor, to take the steps necessary to expunge any
liens rendered unenforceable by the former's discharge in bankruptcy."). For a discussion of the
minority view, see In re Williams, 9 B.R. 228, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (holding that unless a
creditor takes affirmative action to preserve its lien prior to discharge, both the debt and the lien
are extinguished and the creditor loses its in rem rights).
87. See, e.g., In re Pierce, 29 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) ("[T]he secured credi-
tor need only respond to a formal challenge to the security interest.").
88. See, e.g., In re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603, 607 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that a valid
lien survived debtor's discharge notwithstanding creditor's failure to take any action to preserve
the lien during the bankruptcy proceeding).
89. See, e.g., Newman v. First Security Bank of Bozeman, 887 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that the bankruptcy discharge has no effect on a valid pre-petition lien even if the
secured creditor chooses not to file a claim or otherwise assert any interest in its security during
the bankruptcy proceeding).
90. See In re Bouchelle, 98 B.R. 81, 82 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (finding that a creditor
who did not attend the § 341(a) first meeting of creditors nor file a proof of claim was allowed to
enforce its lien against the debtor's property post-discharge); In re Pierce, 29 B.R. 612, 614
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that a secured creditor need only respond to a formal challenge
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Because the creation and validity of a creditor's lien on a debtor's
property is determined by state law, 91 the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Clark v. Bank of Bentonville92 first considered whether Arkansas law
gave the Bank a lien on the Clarks' property. 93 The general rule in
Arkansas is that a creditor obtains a specific lien on the personal prop-
erty fraudulently conveyed by the debtor when the creditor files a com-
plaint to set aside the fraudulent conveyance. 94 Stix v. Chaytor,95 a
case which was decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1891, was
one of the first cases in which this principal was recognized. In Stix, a
creditor brought an action to subject goods fraudulently sold by a
debtor to the payment of a judgment in favor of the creditor.96 The
court held that the filing of a complaint and the service of summons
issued upon it created a lien in favor of the creditor on so much of the
merchandise as was in existence. 97
At the time of the decision in Stix, the granting of a lien upon the
commencement of a fraudulent conveyance action was recognized by
the courts as a reward for those creditors who were diligent in their
pursuit of fraudulently conveyed property. 98 It gave diligent creditors
priority in the distribution of the proceeds from the goods recovered,
to its security interest thus the listing of a secured creditor in the debtor's bankruptcy schedules as
unsecured does not require any response by the secured creditor); In re Weathers, 15 B.R. 945,
949 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) ("[Wihen the reason the secured claim is not allowed is because no
party in interest ever requested allowance, then the lien is not void."). See also 11 U.S.C. §
506(d)(2), which states:
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void, unless -
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any
entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 506.07, at 506-63 (15th ed. 1992).
91. See In re Claussen, 118 B.R. 1009, 1016 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990) (holding that the exis-
tence and perfection of a lien is determined by state law).
92. 308 Ark. 241, 824 S.W.2d 358 (1992).
93. Id. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
94. Id.
95. 55 Ark. 116, 17 S.W. 707 (1881).
96. Id. at 117, 17 S.W. at 708. In Stix the debtor, while indebted to the plaintiff, conveyed
his business and his inventory to his wife. However, the debtor continued to operate the business
as he did before the conveyance. Id.
97. Id. at 122, 17 S.W. at 708.
98. Dostqr v. Manistee Nat'l. Bank, 67 Ark. 325, 339, 55 S.W. 137, 142 (1900) ("[Tjhe
creditor who exercises superior diligence in [uncovering fraudulent conveyances] by first bringing
his suit and proceeding to uncover such assets is entitled to the proceeds. This seems to us to be
eminently just ... ").
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regardless of the priority of other judgments.99 Many courts felt that a
creditor should not be allowed to "lie idle until others have by their
superior diligence discovered the fraud and commenced proceedings in
equity to thwart it by obtaining the cancellation of the conveyance, and
then step forward and reap the first fruits of their diligence." 100 This
rule sometimes had the effect of elevating the rights of a junior
lienholder who took the first steps to recover the property fraudulently
conveyed above the rights of a senior lienholder. 101
In 1912 the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in
Stix'02 in Boyd v. Arnold,03 which involved an action by a creditor to
recover a promissory note assigned by an insolvent debtor to his fa-
ther. 104 In Boyd, the debtor borrowed money from his father to enter a
business partnership. 0 5 The business burned, and a large portion of the
goods were destroyed. 106 The partners sold the remaining goods to a
third person in exchange for two promissory notes of equal value pay-
able to each of the partners. 0 7 The debtor assigned his promissory note
to his father in satisfaction of the borrowed money.' 08 The father col-
lected on the promissory note, and certain creditors of the partnership
brought an action against the father to recover the money collected by
him. 109 The court held that general creditors, by filing a complaint to
cancel a fraudulent conveyance, acquired a specific lien on the personal
property conveyed and thereby gained a priority in the distribution of
the funds recovered over other creditors of the partnership." 0
In another 1912 decision, Goodrich v. Bagnell Timber Co.,"' the
Arkansas Supreme Court was faced with a case very similar to Clark
v. Bank of Bentonville."' In Goodrich, the debtor conveyed all of his
99. Id.
100. A. C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS, § 954, at 2007 (5th ed.
1925).
101. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS, § 455, at 558
(1881).
102. Stix v. Chaytor, 55 Ark. 116, 17 S.W. 707 (1891).
103. 103 Ark. 105, 146 S.W. 118 (1912).
104. Id. at 106-07, 146 S.W. at 119.
105. Id. at 106, 146 S.W. at 119.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 106-07, 146 S.W. at 119.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 107, 146 S.W. at 119.
111. 105 Ark. 90, 150 S.W. 406 (1912).
112. 308 Ark. 241, 824 S.W.2d 358 (1992).
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real and personal property to his wife while a suit to collect a debt was
pending in the court." 3 Upon obtaining a judgment in the pending suit,
the creditor brought an action to cancel the conveyance as a fraudulent
conveyance. " 4 Sixteen months later, the debtor filed a bankruptcy peti-
tion." 5 The court held that the creditor, by filing its suit to cancel the
fraudulent conveyance, acquired a specific lien on the property alleged
to have been fraudulently conveyed."' This specific lien entitled the
creditor to priority in the distribution of the proceeds from the prop-
erty. " 7 The court further held that the suit by the bankruptcy trustee
to recover the property "would not defeat [the creditor's] right to have
[the] proceeds applied to the payment of its claim in the distribution of
the [debtor's assets]." ' '
In reaching its decision in Clark, the Arkansas Supreme Court
expanded the general rule set out in Stix and Arnold to cover fraudu-
lent conveyance actions to recover real property." 9 Unlike Clark, both
Stix and Arnold involved actions to recover personal property. 20 In
Clark, the court held that in fraudulent conveyance actions by credi-
tors to recover real property, the creditor obtains a specific lien on the
property when a notice of lis pendens is filed with the complaint.' 2 '
This lien becomes effective at the time of the filing of the notice of lis
pendens and prior to a judgment of the court in favor of the creditor. 22
The court in Clark further held that the lien created by the filing
of the notice of lis pendens survived the discharge of the Clarks' debt
in the bankruptcy. 2 3 In reaching this decision, the court followed the
rule established in Long 2" and set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2).115
The court pointed out that although the Clarks were aware of the
113. 105 Ark. at 92, 150 S.W. at 406.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 93, 150 S.W. at 406. This is similar to Clark, in which the fraudulent convey-
ance occurred fourteen months before the bankruptcy proceedings were begun. Clark, 308 Ark. at
245, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
116. 105 Ark. at 93, 150 S.W. at 406.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 308 Ark. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (1979 & Supp. 1991), supra note 41.
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Bank's fraudulent conveyance action,'26 they did not take any steps to
avoid the lien created by the filing of the lis pendens during the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 127
The Clarks argued that the "bank should have taken affirmative
action to preserve its lien in the bankruptcy proceeding."' 128 The court
rejected the Clarks' argument that the failure of the Bank to contest its
listing as an unsecured creditor in the Clarks' bankruptcy or to take
affirmative action to assert its lien rendered the lien void. 29 Instead,
the court adopted the majority rule that the debtor, not the creditor,
has the burden of contesting the lien. 30 Because the Clarks didn't take
any action to avoid the Bank's lien, the court held that pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 522(c)(2), the Bank's lien survived the discharge.1 31
The Clarks also argued that under the doctrine of res judicata, the
Bank could not assert its lien post-discharge. 32 The Clarks argued that
"the bank should have either objected to [the Clarks'] discharge, estab-
lished its status as a secured creditor, or pursued its fraudulent convey-
ance action during the bankruptcy proceeding.' 33 The court rejected
all of these arguments.' 3 ' First, the court found that the Bank could
not have objected to the Clarks' discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727
(a)(2)(A) because the fraudulent conveyance occurred more than one
year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. 13
Second, the court rejected the Clarks' argument that the Bank had
126. 308 Ark. at 245, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
127. Id. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
128. Id. at 245-46, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
129. Id. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
130. Id. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 360-61. See In re Thomas, 102 B.R. 199 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1989), supra note 86 and accompanying text.
131. 308 Ark. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 360. See In re Dickinson, 24 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1982) ("[1]t is a long-established principle that unless avoided in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, valid liens will be preserved notwithstanding the discharge of the debtor.").
132. 308 Ark. at 244-45, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 245, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
135. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1988), which states:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless -
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the
estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, de-
stroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed, de-
stroyed, mutilated, or concealed -
(a) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the fil-
ing of the petition. (emphasis added).
See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §§ 727.02(2), 727.12 (15th ed. 1992).
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a duty to establish its secured status during the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. ' 6 In rejecting the Clarks' argument, the court looked at language
in 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2)"3 7 and found that the failure of a creditor to
file a proof of claim or otherwise assert its lien does not avoid an other-
wise valid lien.138
Third, the court found that the Bank lacked standing to pursue its
fraudulent conveyance action in the bankruptcy proceeding.' 39 The
court stated that the Bankruptcy Code does not give the Bank the
power to directly pursue a cause of action to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance. 4" The court also pointed out that the Bank was prohibited
by the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C § 362(a) from acting against the
Clarks' property during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.'41
Although the trustee may choose to pursue a creditor's unsecured state
law claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), 42 "such an action is an
exercise of the avoidance power for the benefit of all creditors."' 4 3
Since the Bank did not have standing as a single creditor to pursue the
136. 308 Ark. at 245, 824 S.W.2d at 360. See also In re Dickinson, 24 B.R. 547 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1982). In Dickinson, a group of doctors filed a state court action to enforce a lien
created prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing. Id. at 548-49. The doctors were listed as unsecured
creditors on the debtor's bankruptcy schedules and the debt was discharged in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Id. at 549. The court noted that although the debtor's attorney was aware of the
existence of the liens, no action was taken by the debtor to avoid the liens during the bankruptcy
proceeding. Id. at 549-50. The court held, therefore, that the liens survived the discharge of the
debtor's debt. Id.
137. 308 Ark. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 360-61. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (Supp. 1991) states:
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void, unless -
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any
entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
138. 308 Ark. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361. See also In re Weathers, 15 B.R. 945, 949
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) ("[Wihen the reason the secured claim is not allowed is because no party
in interest ever requested allowance, then the lien is not void.").
139. Id. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361.
140. Id.
141. Id. See also, In re Weathers, 15 B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (explaining that
during the bankruptcy proceeding, a creditor is stayed pursuant to I I U.S.C. § 362(a) from tak-
ing any actions against property of the estate or property of the debtor).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) states:
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor
holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is
not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
143. 308 Ark. at 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361.
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fraudulent conveyance action during the bankruptcy proceeding,""' res
judicata did not prohibit the Bank's subsequent state court action.""
With its decision in Clark v. Bank of Bentonville, the Arkansas
Supreme Court expanded its previous holdings in Boyd""8 and Stix4 7
and held that a creditor obtains a lien on real property when the credi-
tor files a notice of lis pendens with a complaint to recover a fraudulent
conveyance.148 This decision has the effect of giving the creditor a non-
consensual lien on real property prior to any court adjudication. In es-
sence, the court has devised a method by which an unsecured creditor
may be transformed to a secured creditor with a lien that survives the
bankruptcy discharge. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas greatly expanded the generally understood notice function
of a notice of lis pendens.1"
Further, the Clark decision gives creditors another weapon to co-
erce debtors into repaying discharged debts. By threatening to foreclose
a lien on the debtor's real property, creditors may be able to force the
debtor to reaffirm the debtor's personal obligation on a previously dis-
charged debt.1 50
Additionally, because creditors routinely file notices of lis pendens
when commencing actions against debtors involving real property, the
Clark decision also means that attorneys for debtors in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings must now take affirmative action to discover lis pendens no-
tices that have been filed against the debtor. Debtors' attorneys must
also take action in the bankruptcy to avoid the lien, if possible, so that
it will not survive the discharge.1 51
It may also become necessary for debtors to immediately file a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding following a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
144. See Nebraska State Bank v. Jones, 846 F.2d 477, 478 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that a
single creditor lacks standing to pursue a fraudulent conveyance action).
145. 308 Ark. 246, 824 S.W.2d at 361.
146. Boyd v. Arnold, 103 Ark. 105, 146 S.W. 118 (1912).
147. Stix v. Chaytor, 55 Ark. 116, 17 S.W. 707 (1891).
148. 308 Ark. at 244, 824 S.W.2d at 360.
149. See 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 3 (1987) ("IT]he purpose of lis pendens or notice of lis
pendens is to give effective notice to third persons of pendency of litigation affecting prop-
erty .. "). Other courts have rejected the argument that the filing of a notice of lis pendens
creates a lien. See, e.g., In re Ressler, 61 B.R. 403, 406 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986) (indicating that
the entry of a judgment in chancery court did not create, much less perfect, a lien, even though
the creditor had filed notice of lis pendens); In re Miller, 39 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1984) ("[T]hc filing of a lis pendens notice under the [Alaska] statute does not create a lien.").
150. See Hunt, supra note 21, at 432.
151. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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proceeding in order to avoid foreclosure of a lien on the debtor's real
property after the Chapter 7 discharge.152 Once a debtor has dis-
charged its unsecured debts in the Chapter 7 proceeding, it may be
forced to repay the debts secured by liens on real property through a
Chapter 13 plan. This will greatly minimize the benefits of the legisla-
tively intended "fresh start" for debtors receiving a bankruptcy
discharge.
Finally, the decision in Clark will also adversely affect general
creditors of a debtor who do not pursue the fraudulent conveyance.
When a trustee recovers fraudulently conveyed real property, the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the property recovered go for the benefit of all
creditors. Pursuant to the holding of this case, a creditor who com-
mences a fraudulent conveyance action and files a notice of lis pendens
has priority in the distribution of the proceeds. This means that the
creditor will get paid in full before any distribution is made to other
creditors, thereby diminishing the pool of assets available to general
creditors of the debtor.
By improving the priority status of unsecured judgment creditors,
the Clark decision provides a definite incentive to creditors to discover
fraudulent conveyances by the debtor and to take actions to avoid those
conveyances. Additionally, it places debtors' attorneys on notice that
affirmative action should be taken to discover the filing of lis pendens
notices and to avoid the resulting liens in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Mary Krikorian
152. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
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